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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
We seldom focus on how to balance the four factors 
that determine whether to grant a stay pending appeal despite 
the practical and legal importance of these procedural 
standstills.  So we take this opportunity to do just that.1   
I. BACKGROUND 
                                              
1  Because of the time-sensitive nature of this appeal, we were 
unable to give a full rationale for our ruling on the date we 
entered judgment in favor of Appellant IDEA Boardwalk, 
LLC, reversing the District Court’s denial of its stay request.  




In April 2012 Appellee Revel AC, Inc., et al. 
(“Revel”) opened a 47-story, 710-foot-high resort-casino 
(which we refer to simply as the “Casino”) in Atlantic City, 
New Jersey.  The Casino was marketed as “a state of the art 
gaming and resort facility unlike any other in Atlantic City.”  
Its cost: $2.4 billion, making it the most expensive hotel ever 
built in Atlantic City.  See Tom Corrigan, Atlantic City’s 
Revel Casino Files for Bankruptcy Again, Wall Street J. (June 
19, 2014, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/atlantic-
citys-revel-casino-files-for-bankruptcy-again-1403212625).  
As part of its plan for the Casino, Revel entered into a lease 
with Appellant IDEA Boardwalk, LLC (“IDEA”) to run two 
upscale nightclubs and a beach club.  The lease was for a 10-
year term (with a 15-year option to extend) and obligated 
IDEA to contribute $16 million of the $80 million projected 
cost of construction of the clubs (in addition to its monthly 
rental payments as lessee).      
Unfortunately the Casino’s $2.4 billion price tag was 
no indication of its future success.  A sluggish Atlantic City 
economy and the Casino’s inability to turn a profit were too 
much for Revel to overcome.  After a failed sale attempt, 
Revel’s cash flow problems made a (second) trip to 
bankruptcy the only option.2  It filed a so-called  
“Chapter 22” on June 19, 2014.3  As part of its first-day 
                                              
2  Revel had previously filed under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code in March 2013 and confirmed a plan of 
reorganization in May of that same year.    
 
3  A number of Revel’s subsidiaries also filed for bankruptcy.  
They include Revel AC, LLC, Revel Atlantic City, LLC, 
Revel Entertainment Group, LLC, NB Acquisition, LLC, and 
SI LLC.  For convenience, we refer to Revel and its 
subsidiaries jointly and severally as “Revel.”    
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filings, Revel asked the Bankruptcy Court for permission to 
sell its assets free and clear of all liens and interests (which 
includes leases) and to approve bid procedures to allow that 
sale as quickly as possible.  The Court approved the request 
and set August 7, 2014 as the auction date.   
A.  Revel’s Attempt to Sell the Casino in 
Bankruptcy 
The request to sell the Casino “free and clear” raised 
the ire of its tenants—among them, IDEA.4  Its concern was 
that, were the sale as proposed to occur, the value of its lease 
would turn to zero notwithstanding its initial $16 million 
investment.  To protect that investment, IDEA filed 
objections to the proposed sale.  It made clear that its intent 
was not to scuttle the sale, but to block Revel from selling the 
Casino stripped of its lease.  Citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(h), IDEA 
argued that, notwithstanding a rejection of that lease, it can 
retain its possessory interest, as the subsection provides that a 
lessee may retain its rights under such lease 
. . . for the balance of the term of such lease 
and for any renewal or extension of such 
rights to the extent that such rights are 
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law.      
11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii).  Alternatively, IDEA contended 
that even if § 365(h) did not secure its interest, § 363(f)—the 
                                                                                                     
 
4  The other tenants include: (1) the so-called “Amenity 
Tenants” (made up of a group of companies that operated an 
array of food, liquor, and retail establishments within the 
Casino); and (2) ACR Energy Partners (the provider of water 
and power to the Casino).        
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Code provision that allows for the sale of an asset free and 
clear5—was of no use to Revel, as it couldn’t satisfy any of 
the five alternative conditions necessary to trigger a sale 
under its strictures.      
Notwithstanding the objection of IDEA, Revel 
continued the auction process and embarked on a lengthy 
marketing campaign, communicating with over 200 potential 
investors.  Unfortunately the market for Revel’s assets proved 
thin, and, because not a single qualified buyer came to the 
table, the Bankruptcy Court postponed the August 7 auction.   
About a month later, on September 2, Revel closed the 
Casino’s doors and barred its tenants, IDEA included, from 
accessing the Casino premises.  When that happened, IDEA 
gave written notice that (1) it intended to continue operating 
its beach club and one of its nightclubs notwithstanding the 
Casino’s closure and (2) it expected Revel to continue to 
abide by the terms of its lease.  More specifically, IDEA 
asked that Revel “continue to honor its obligation under the 
Lease to provide uninterrupted utility service.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 
96, IDEA Boardwalk, LLC v. Revel Entm’t Grp., LLC, No. 
14-01756 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2014), ECF No. 6.  To put 
its plan into action, IDEA met with representatives from 
                                              
5  Subsection 363(f) provides that a debtor can sell its assets 
free and clear of “any interest” (here a lease) if (1) applicable 
nonbankruptcy law so permits, (2) the interest holder 
consents, (3) the interest is a lien and the price at which the 
debtor’s assets are being sold is greater than the value of all 
the liens on its property, (4) the validity of the interest is in 
bona fide dispute, or (5) the interest holder, whether in a legal 
or equitable proceeding, could be compelled to accept a 




various city agencies to secure approval to operate on a stand-
alone basis and sued Revel to enjoin it from “failing to 
provide utilities and parking” and engaging in any other 
conduct “that prevents IDEA from operating the HQ Dayclub 
and HQ Nightclub in accordance with the terms of the 
Lease.”  Id. ¶ 118.  Furthermore, and to assert its rights under 
§ 365(h), IDEA sought a declaratory judgment that, “under 
applicable law[,] the Lease is a lease of non-residential real 
property as that term is defined and governed by 11 U.S.C. § 
365 and, as such, is entitled to all relevant statutory 
protections, including, but not limited to[,] 11 U.S.C. § 
365(h).”  Id. ¶ 144(a).6           
B. Polo North Becomes “Stalking Horse” 
Bidder 
Revel’s continued marketing efforts paid off when it 
came to terms on September 5, 2014 with Polo North Country 
Club, an entity controlled by a Florida-based real estate 
developer.  Under the proposed Asset Purchase Agreement, 
Polo North agreed to buy the Casino for $90 million and to 
serve as the “stalking horse” bidder at the upcoming auction.  
If Polo North lost at auction, it would receive $3 million as a 
break-up fee.  If, however, Polo North walked away from the 
deal, it would surrender its $10 million deposit.  The 
Bankruptcy Court approved Revel’s request to modify the 
                                              
6  In connection with Revel’s first bankruptcy case, IDEA 
likewise sought, among other things, essentially the same 
declaration.  Am. Compl. ¶ 89(a), IDEA Boardwalk, LLC v. 
Revel AC, Inc., No. 13-2013 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 30, 2014), 
ECF No. 7.  In its answer, Revel “[d]enied” IDEA’s 
allegation that it held a non-residential lease.  See Answer ¶¶ 
82–89, IDEA Boardwalk, LLC v. Revel AC, Inc., No. 13-2013 
(Bankr. D.N.J. June 13, 2014), ECF No. 8.                        
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auction bid procedures to allow for the payment of the break-
up fee and set a revised bid deadline for September 24, 2014.  
At the postponed auction, which ultimately took place on 
October 1, the highest bidder was not Polo North but 
Brookfield U.S. Holdings, LLC, as its $110 million bid 
topped the $94.5 million all-cash bid of Polo North.  The 
Bankruptcy Court approved the sale to Brookfield on 
October 7. 
Reentering the picture, IDEA argued that “it has the 
right under Section 365(h) of the [] Code to elect to remain in 
possession and[,] in that event, [Revel] [is] obligated to 
provide possession and rights appurtenant thereto,” including 
“various easements for utilities and other services.”  
Objection of IDEA Boardwalk, LLC ¶¶ 74, 77, In re Revel 
AC, Inc., No. 14-22654 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2014), ECF 
No. 754.  IDEA also reaffirmed that, because it “has direct 
access to the boardwalk and the streets,” it “can operate [its 
clubs] without impinging . . . [Revel’s] possessory rights.”  
Id. ¶ 78.  
Before Revel could respond, Brookfield walked away 
from the deal, thus surrendering its $11 million deposit and 
bringing Polo North back into the fold as the back-up winning 
bidder.  The Bankruptcy Court thereafter granted Revel’s 
motion to terminate the sale to Brookfield and scheduled a 
hearing to approve the sale to Polo North.    
C. Revel Responds to IDEA at the 11th Hour   
Late on the Friday night just three days before the 
January 5, 2015 sale hearing, Revel filed an “Omnibus 
Reply” to IDEA’s objections.  Regarding the latter’s § 365(h) 
argument, Revel urged the Court to follow the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel 
SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003), which held that 
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§ 365(h) doesn’t disable § 363(f)’s authority to sell property 
subject to a lease free and clear of that lease and instead 
triggers only when a debtor seeks to reject a lease under § 
365. Id. at 548.  Revel also asserted that it could satisfy one of 
§ 363(f)’s five conditions—namely, § 363(f)(4)—because a 
bona fide dispute exists with respect to the validity of IDEA’s 
lease.  According to Revel, though the form of its agreement 
with IDEA gives the appearance of a lease, because rent was 
“based entirely on a percentage of the revenue derived from” 
IDEA’s operations, it was not a “true lease[] entitled to 
benefit from the applicable protections set forth in the 
Bankruptcy Code.”  Debtors’ Omnibus Reply ¶ 20, In re 
Revel AC, Inc., No. 14-22654 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2015), 
ECF No. 1109.      
D. The Sale Hearing 
At the sale hearing, the Bankruptcy Court considered 
the following legal issues: (1) whether sales of property under 
§ 363(f) can wipe out a lessee’s possessory interest under 
§ 365(h); and (2) whether Revel introduced enough evidence 
to show that the validity of IDEA’s lease was the subject of a 
bona fide dispute under § 363(f)(4), thus satisfying an 
eligibility requirement to invoke subsection (f).7  Only if the 
                                              
7  The Bankruptcy Court did not address whether IDEA 
would receive adequate protection under 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) 
if the Casino were sold free and clear of its lease.  Under that 
provision, where a tenant expects to lose its lease and asks for 
protection of its interest, “the court, with or without a hearing, 
shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is 
necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.”      
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Court found in favor of Revel on each of these two issues 
could it sell the Casino free and clear of IDEA’s lease.      
On the first issue, the Bankruptcy Court pointed to a 
“split of authority”: some courts hold that § 363(f) doesn’t cut 
off a tenant’s possessory rights under § 365(h), see, e.g., In re 
Zota Petroleums, LLC, 482 B.R. 154, 163 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 
2012), while others go another path to say that § 365(h) “says 
nothing at all about sales of estate property, which are the 
province of section 363,” Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 547, the 
result in the latter case being that sales of property under § 
363 can cut off the possessory interests of lessees under § 
365.  See Sale Hr’g Tr. 51:9-13, In re Revel AC, Inc., No. 14-
22654 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2015), ECF No. 1175.         
The second issue, the Bankruptcy Court conceded, 
presented “the more difficult” legal question: whether Revel 
had enough evidence to show that the validity of IDEA’s 
lease was the subject of a bona fide dispute under § 363(f)(4).  
Id. at 52:21–22.  The trouble was that Revel didn’t provide 
the purportedly disputed lease to the Bankruptcy Court or 
much of anything to cloud its validity, though § 363(f) places 
the burden squarely on Revel’s shoulders.  See id. at 53:3–5 
(“[Revel] didn’t give me any of the leases . . . or any, really, 
evidence in support of its position of the bona[]fide dispute . . 
. .”).  But, because of the need to push the sale through, the 
Court maintained that it “can’t look at the result totally as to 
what the law requires,” id. at 53:8, though, if time weren’t of 
the essence, it “probably would have put [the hearing] off to 
have more evidence presented,” id. at 55:12–13.  With not 
much to go on, the Court concluded that, because IDEA (and 
the other tenants) were akin to “partners of [Revel’s] 
enterprise,” id. at 54:14–15, rather than mere tenants, Revel 
met its burden that “there is a bona[]fide issue in dispute” as 
to the leases, id. at 55:16–17.  Hence the Court approved the 
sale and allowed Revel to sell its assets “free and clear of 
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existing tenancies and/or possessory rights, irrespective of 
any rights a tenant may hold under 11 U.S.C. § 365(h), 
including, but not limited to, all possessory rights.”  Sale 
Order ¶ 14, In re Revel AC, Inc., No. 14-22654 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
Jan. 8, 2015), ECF No. 1138.   
IDEA appealed that order and moved to stay the 
Court’s decision pending appeal, noting the risk that, if the 
decision were not stayed, its appeal would be moot under 
11 U.S.C. § 363(m) once the sale closed.  That provision 
provides, in relevant part, that 
[t]he reversal or modification on appeal of an 
authorization . . . of a sale or lease of property 
does not affect the validity of a sale or lease 
under such authorization to an entity that 
purchased or leased such property in good faith, 
whether or not such entity knew of the 
pendency of the appeal, unless such 
authorization and such sale or lease were stayed 
pending appeal. 
11 U.S.C. § 363(m).  In a one-paragraph order, the 
Bankruptcy Court denied IDEA’s request.  With its options 
dwindling and time winding down, IDEA filed an emergency 
motion before the District Court to stay the Bankruptcy 
Court’s sale order.   
E. The District Court Denies IDEA’s Stay 
Request 
In considering whether to grant a stay pending appeal, 
courts consider the following four factors: (1) whether the 
appellant has made a strong showing of the likelihood of 
success on the merits; (2) will the appellant suffer irreparable 
injury absent a stay; (3) would a stay substantially harm other 
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parties with an interest in the litigation; and (4) whether a stay 
is in the public interest.  See, e.g., Republic of Phil. v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 
1991).  Because IDEA is the only party before us, we limit 
our examination of the District Court’s ruling to its treatment 
of IDEA’s objections.    
1. Likelihood of Success  
On the first prong, the District Court maintained that 
IDEA needed to show that it had a “substantial” or “strong” 
case on appeal.  In re Revel AC, Inc., 525 B.R. 12, 24 (D.N.J. 
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Addressing 
§ 365(h) first, the Court noted that, because the legal issue 
was the subject of an “undisputed split of authority,” IDEA at 
most showed a possibility and not a likelihood (which we 
understood the Court to mean more likely than not) of 
success.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
It next addressed whether the Bankruptcy Court 
clearly erred in finding that Revel put forth enough evidence 
to show that a bona fide dispute existed as to the validity of 
IDEA’s lease.  See id. at 26.  Despite the Bankruptcy Court’s 
failure to mention it, the District Court emphasized that 
“IDEA specifically sought a declaratory judgment concerning 
the nature of [its] agreement with [Revel],” id. at 29, even 
though, as IDEA asserted, its lawsuit “principally concerned 
[its] request for an energy easement, rather than an effort . . . 
to challenge the characterization of its Agreement,” id. at 29 
n.14.  In the District Court’s view, the pending litigation 
“arguably provide[d] some objective basis . . . to find . . . 
some bona fide issue in dispute,” id. at 29 (emphases added), 
because, “in answering [the] complaint, [Revel] specifically 
denied that [the] Agreement constituted a lease,” id. at 29 
n.14.  Consequently, the District Court concluded that IDEA 
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did not “demonstrate[] a likelihood of success on the merits” 
of the § 363(f)(4) issue either.  Id. at 30.8           
2. Irreparable Harm  
On the irreparable-harm prong, the District Court 
considered whether IDEA had “demonstrated the potential for 
an actual and imminent, rather than remote or speculative, 
irreparable harm.”  Id. at 31. IDEA posited that, absent a stay, 
if Revel and Polo North closed on the sale, this would render 
its claim statutorily moot under § 363(m), leading to the loss 
of its lease and the end of its business at the Casino.  In the 
                                              
8  The District Court came to the same conclusion regarding 
whether Revel satisfied § 363(e)’s adequate protection 
requirement.  IDEA had argued that adequate protection 
means continued possession of its lease, not merely money 
damages, as the Code provides that “adequate protection may 
be provided by . . . granting such other relief . . . as will result 
in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent 
of such entity’s interest in such property.”  11 U.S.C. § 
361(3).  But the Court thought otherwise, declaring that 
rejection damages were an adequate substitute for continued 
possession.  See In re Revel, 525 B.R. at 31 (noting that “it is 
more than arguable that granting possession to [IDEA] in the 
present circumstances of a catastrophically failed casino-hotel 
concept would be no more ‘adequate’ than what [it] received, 
namely, the right to assert [a] claim[] for rejection damages or 
other relief as [an] unsecured creditor[]”).  It also minimized 
the Bankruptcy Court’s failure to make any findings on 
whether IDEA’s interest would be adequately protected.  In 
the District Court’s view, because the Bankruptcy Court 
found that § 363(f) was satisfied, it “necessarily found the 
interests of [the various tenants] adequately protected.”  Id.  
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District Court’s view, a mooted claim doesn’t qualify as an 
irreparable injury nor does the potential loss of IDEA’s 
possessory rights.  See id.  Regarding the latter, the Court 
noted that IDEA effectively had been dispossessed since 
September 2014 and would gain nothing by retaking 
possession of a space “in an empty and commercially-
unproductive building.”  Id. at 32; see also id. at 31 
(“[T]hough the [tenants] assert that the loss of their 
possessory rights would result in irreparable injury, [they] 
ignore that they have been without valuable possessory rights 
since September 2014.”).  Hence, as with the first prong, the 
Court held it did not weigh in IDEA’s favor. 
3. Harm to Others  
For the third factor in the stay analysis, IDEA 
contended that, because it doesn’t seek a stay of the sale itself 
but only the provision of the Sale Order that terminates its 
lease, Revel wouldn’t be injured.  The District Court, 
focusing only on the debtor (presumably because it was the 
only party opposing IDEA’s stay motion), thought otherwise.  
In its view, because of the “easily terminable $10 million 
option [of Polo North] to purchase [Revel’s] assets,” there 
was a good chance it “would elect not to proceed with 
closing” if the Court granted the stay.  Id. at 32 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  And “the palpable risk of losing a 
ready buyer,” the Court maintained, “demonstrates . . . a risk 
of substantial harm to [Revel].”  Id. (emphasis omitted); see 
also id. at 33 (describing Revel’s exhaustive search for a 
buyer that yielded only two qualified buyers).  Thus it found 
that the third factor weighed against a stay. 
4. Public Interest  
Finally, IDEA asserted that the public interest favors a 
stay because the public has a strong interest in the correct 
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application of bankruptcy law and the continuing operation of 
hospitality providers at Revel.  Again the District Court 
disagreed.  In its view, even assuming that IDEA expressed 
valid public policy concerns, “such concerns would not 
sufficiently outweigh the far more prevalent interest in 
facilitating the success of bankruptcy proceedings,” id., along 
with the “permanent loss of approximately 4,000 jobs” and 
“substantial detriment to the City of Atlantic City and [] 
surrounding areas” a failed sale could trigger, id. at 34 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  As with the first three 
factors, the public interest “favors the facilitation of the asset 
sale, and, accordingly, weighs against the imposition of a 
stay.”  Id.   
IDEA appeals.   
II. JURISDICTION  
Revel argues that we don’t have jurisdiction to 
entertain IDEA’s appeal from the District Court’s stay denial 
under either 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  
We disagree.  Subsection 158(d)(1) provides that “[t]he courts 
of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees” entered under 
subsections 158(a) and (b).  Though a stay denial is not 
technically a final judgment, it is here in a practical sense 
because, under 11 U.S.C. § 363(m), the upshot of declining 
IDEA’s stay request is to prevent it from obtaining a full 
airing of its issues on appeal and a decision on the merits, as 
that provision protects purchasers from any modification on 
appeal of an order authorizing a sale.  Consequently, the 
District Court’s decision denying IDEA’s stay request was 
final for purposes of § 158(d)(1).  See In re Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 18 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(acknowledging that “finality must be viewed more 
pragmatically in bankruptcy appeals under § 158(d) than in 
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other contexts”); see also James M. Grippando, Circuit Court 
Review of Orders on Stays Pending Bankruptcy Appeals to 
U.S. District Courts or Appellate Panels, 62 Am. Bankr. L.J. 
353, 360 (1988) (arguing that “‘finality’ for purposes of 
section 158 is a fluid concept to be determined [on] a case by 
case basis”).   
Our decision in Trans World Airlines is not to the 
contrary.  The question there was whether the District Court’s 
grant of a stay was final for purposes of § 158(d).  We held 
that it was not, “[e]ven under the most relaxed concept of 
finality,” because the stay grant didn’t “fully adjudicate a 
specific adversary proceeding between the parties.”  In re 
Trans World Airlines, 18 F.3d at 216.  The difference here is 
that the District Court denied a stay, and the practical effect 
was to resolve IDEA’s appeal on the merits, as the 
combination of the imminent closing of the sale and § 363(m) 
would have mooted its appeal.   
Thus, where it is all but assured that a statute will 
render an appeal moot absent a stay, a stay denial is 
appealable under § 158(d)(1).  We express no opinion on 
whether we have also have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1)—see generally In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 
115 F.3d 1294, 1300 (7th Cir. 1997) (exercising jurisdiction 
over a stay denial under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) because the 
District Court’s order had “both the effect of an injunction 
and [] serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences” (quoting 
Cent. States v. Cent. Cartage Co., 84 F.3d 988, 991 (7th Cir. 
1996) (internal quotation marks omitted))—and leave for 
another day whether we have jurisdiction to review a stay 
denial where the underlying appeal could become equitably 
moot.   
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
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At this juncture, only the District Court’s denial of 
IDEA’s stay request is at issue.  We generally review appeals 
from a denial of a stay for abuse of discretion, see Bradley v. 
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990), 
giving “proper regard to . . . [the District Court’s] ‘feel’ of the 
case,” Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 
F.2d 1190, 1197 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J.) (citation 
omitted).  However, we review de novo the District Court’s 
decision on the likelihood of success, for it involves a purely 
legal determination.  See In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 115 
F.3d at 1301.                      
IV. ANALYSIS 
Despite the growing importance of stays pending 
appeal, we have provided little direction on how to balance 
the four stay factors, mostly “[b]ecause this [C]ourt ordinarily 
grants or denies a stay pending appeal without opinion.”  
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 949 F.2d at 658.  Despite its 
comprehensiveness, Westinghouse unfortunately shed little 
light on how to balance the four stay factors when not all of 
them point in the same direction.  (The factors there all 
favored a stay denial.)  We take this opportunity to provide 
guidance on how to conduct a balancing of the stay factors.   
A. The Sliding-Scale Approach to Balancing the 
Stay Factors 
Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007, a 
party can move to stay the effect of a bankruptcy court order 
pending a resolution on appeal.  See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007.  
The factors considered “overlap” the familiar ones courts 
look to in ruling on applications for preliminary injunctions.  
See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (observing that 
“similar concerns arise whenever a court order may allow or 
disallow anticipated action before the legality of that action 
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has been conclusively determined”).  To repeat essentially 
what was already noted above, the following factors come 
into play: 
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a 
strong showing that [it] is likely to succeed on 
the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether 
issuance of the stay will substantially injure 
the other parties interested in the proceeding; 
and (4) where the public interest lies.  
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).  In order not 
to ignore the many gray shadings stay requests present, courts 
“balance[e] them all” and “consider the relative strength of 
the four factors.”  Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 
785, 789 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fargo Women’s Health 
Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 538 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also 16A Charles Alan Wright 
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3954 (4th ed. 2008) 
(“The four factors should be balanced; thus, for example, if 
the balance of harms tips heavily enough in the stay 
applicant’s favor then the showing of likelihood of success 
need not be as strong, and vice versa.” (footnotes omitted)).     
“[T]he most critical” factors, according to the Supreme 
Court, Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, are the first two: whether the 
stay movant has demonstrated (1) a strong showing of the 
likelihood of success and (2) that it will suffer irreparable 
harm—the latter referring to “harm that cannot be prevented 
or fully rectified” by a successful appeal, Roland Mach. Co. 
v. Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, 
J.).  Though both are necessary, the former is arguably the 
more important piece of the stay analysis.  As Judge Posner 
has remarked, it isn’t enough that the failure to obtain a stay 
will be “a disaster” for the stay movant but only a “minor 
 19 
 
inconvenience to the defendant,” as “[e]quity jurisdiction 
exists only to remedy legal wrongs; [thus,] without some 
showing of a probable right[,] there is no basis for invoking 
it.”  Id. at 387. 
Just how strong of a merits case must a stay applicant 
show?  The “formulations used to describe the degree of 
likelihood of success that must be shown” vary widely.  
Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(emphasis in original).  To give but a sampling of the range 
that exists, some require a showing that the underlying appeal 
is “more likely to succeed than fail.”  Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 
754 F.2d 1015, 1026 (2d Cir. 1985) overruled on other 
grounds by O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987).  Others call for a “substantial possibility, although 
less than a likelihood, of success.”  Dubose v. Pierce, 761 
F.2d 913, 920 (2d Cir. 1985)9 (quoting Hayes v. City Univ. of 
N.Y., 503 F. Supp. 946, 963 (S.D.N.Y 1980)) vacated on 
other grounds 108 S.Ct. 2890 (1988); see also generally John 
Y. Gotanda, The Emerging Standards for Issuing Appellate 
Stays, 45 Baylor L. Rev. 809, 813–15 (1993).  For our Court, 
a sufficient degree of success for a strong showing exists if 
there is “a reasonable chance, or probability, of winning.”  
Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 
229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  Thus, while it “is not enough 
that the chance of success on the merits be ‘better than 
negligible,’” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 (citation omitted), the 
likelihood of winning on appeal need not be “more likely than 
not,” Singer Mgmt. Consultants, 650 F.3d at 229; see also 
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 
559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the trouble 
                                              
9  Yes, we realize this is the same Circuit Court in the same 
year.  Read on and realize that we are not immune from 
internal tensions in our opinions.  
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with a “strict ‘probability’ requirement is [] it leads to an 
exaggeratedly refined analysis of the merits at an early stage 
in the litigation”).   
On the second factor, the applicant must “demonstrate 
that irreparable injury is likely [not merely possible] in the 
absence of [a] [stay].”  Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (emphasis in text).  While a 
reference to “likelihood” of success on the merits has been 
interpreted by courts to cover the generic range of outcomes, 
for irreparable harm we understand the Supreme Court’s use 
of “likely” to mean more apt to occur than not. See generally 
Michigan v. U.S. Army Core of Engineers, 667 F.3d 765, 788 
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding that for harm to be likely “there must 
be more than a mere possibility that harm will come to pass 
… but the alleged harm need not be occurring or be certain 
before a court may grant relief”) (citation omitted). 
 “Once an applicant satisfies the first two factors, the 
traditional stay inquiry calls for assessing the harm to the 
opposing party and weighing the public interest.”  Nken, 556 
U.S. at 435.  We weigh the likely harm to the movant (absent 
a stay) (factor two) against the likely irreparable harm to the 
stay opponent(s) if the stay is granted (factor three).  This is 
called the balancing of harms or balancing of equities.  We 
also take into account where the public interest lies (factor 
four)—in effect, how a stay decision has “consequences 
beyond the immediate parties.”  Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 
388.   
In this context, a number of outcomes are possible.  
Where the balance of harms and public interest weigh in 
favor of a stay and the court deems that the stay movant has 
made a sufficient showing of success on appeal, a stay should 
be granted.  Where the opposite is true—i.e., the merits, 
balance of harms, and public interest favor the stay 
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opponent—a stay should be denied.  Between these easy 
examples are the more difficult cases, such as “where the 
merits favor one party and the balance of harms favors the 
other.”  Gotanda, supra, at 821.  There (along with the public 
interest) we must “evaluate the degree of irreparable injury 
with the prospects of prevailing on the merits.”  Id.   
In deciding how strong a case a stay movant must 
show, we have viewed favorably what is often referred to as 
the “sliding-scale” approach.  See Constructors Ass’n of W. 
Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 815 (3d Cir. 1978); Del. River 
Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transp., Inc., 501 F.2d 
917 (3d Cir. 1974).  Under it, “[t]he necessary ‘level’ or 
‘degree’ of possibility of success will vary according to the 
court’s assessment of the other [stay] factors.’”  Mohammed, 
309 F.3d at 101 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wash. 
Metro., 559 F.2d at 843).  Stated another way, “[t]he more 
likely the plaintiff is to win, the less heavily need the balance 
of harms weigh in [its] favor; the less likely [it] is to win, the 
more need it weigh in [its] favor.”  Roland Mach., 749 F.2d at 
387.  As we described in Kreps (in considering all four 
factors though in the context of deciding whether to grant a 
preliminary injunction),   
in a situation where factors of irreparable harm, 
interests of third parties and public 
considerations strongly favor the moving party, 
an injunction might be appropriate even though 
plaintiffs did not demonstrate as strong a 
likelihood of ultimate success as would 
generally be required.  In contrast, where the 
threatened irreparable injury is limited or is 
balanced to a substantial degree by 
countervailing injuries which would result to 
third parties, or to the public interest from the 
issuance of an injunction, greater significance 
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must be placed upon the likelihood that the 
party will ultimately succeed on the merits of 
the litigation.  
573 F.2d at 815 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see In re A & F Enters., Inc. II, 742 F.3d 763, 766 
(7th Cir. 2014) (“As with a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, a ‘sliding scale’ approach applies; the greater the 
moving party’s likelihood of success on the merits, the less 
heavily the balance of harms must weigh in its favor, and vice 
versa.”); Mohammed, 309 F.3d at 101 (“The probability of 
success that must be demonstrated is inversely proportional to 
the amount of irreparable injury plaintiff[] will suffer absent 
the stay.  Simply stated, more of one excuses less of the 
other.” (alteration in original) (quoting Mich. Coal. of 
Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 
150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991).   
Keeping in mind that the first two factors are the most 
critical, if “the chance of success on the merits [is only] better 
than negligible” and the “possibility of irreparable injury” is 
low, a stay movant’s request fails.  Nken, 556 U.S. at 434 
(internal quotation  marks omitted).  Likewise, “even if a 
movant demonstrates irreparable harm that decidedly 
outweighs any potential harm to the [stay opponent] if a stay 
is granted, [it] is still required to show, at a minimum, 
‘serious questions going to the merits.’”  Mich. Coal. of 
Radioactive Material Users, 945 F.2d at 153–54 (quoting In 
re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 
1985)). 
Our dissenting colleague criticizes the “sliding-scale” 
approach as “fail[ing] to honor” Third Circuit precedent.  
Dissenting Op. 1.  In her view, there is no balancing—a 
court’s consideration of a stay request is an all-or-nothing 
proposition.  To merit a stay, she believes, the stay applicant 
 23 
 
must “demonstrate,” id., that it will “satisfy,” id. at 3, each of 
the four stay factors.  If it doesn’t, then, even if the stay 
applicant’s chances of success on appeal are assured (let 
alone more probable than not) and the applicant will likely 
suffer an irreparable injury, a stay must be denied if, for 
example, it isn’t in the public interest.  That approach is not 
only impractical, it has the potential to be deeply unfair, and 
is one we have explicitly disavowed.  In Delaware River Port 
Authority v. Transamerican Trailer Transport, for example, 
we couldn’t have been clearer in establishing that 
“consideration of [the four] factors by the district court 
requires a ‘delicate balancing.’”  501 F.2d at 920.  We 
reaffirmed that concept in Kreps in observing that “no one 
aspect” of the stay analysis “will necessarily determine its 
outcome,” 573 F.2d at 815, assuming, we pause to note, that 
the party seeking a stay has made a sufficient showing on the 
first two factors.  Therefore, where the balance of harms and 
public interest “strongly favor[]” a stay, a court may enter it 
even if the applicant didn’t “demonstrate as strong a 
likelihood of ultimate success as would generally be 
required.”  Del. River Port Auth., 501 F.2d at 923.  Relatedly, 
“when considerable injury will result from either the grant or 
denial of a preliminary injunction, these factors [i.e., the 
balance of harms] to some extent cancel each other and 
greater significance must be placed upon the likelihood that 
each party will ultimately succeed on the merits of the 
litigation.”  Id. at 924.  To the extent later statements in our 
opinions suggest the opposite—that “a complete failure to 
satisfy any one of [the stay] factors precludes a stay,” 
Dissenting Op. 2—they are not binding.  See United States v. 
Rivera, 365 F.3d 213, 213 (3d Cir. 2004) (“This Circuit has 
long held that if its cases conflict, the earlier is the controlling 
authority and the latter is ineffective as precedents.”).                            
To sum up, all four stay factors are interconnected, and 
thus the analysis should proceed as follows.  Did the applicant 
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make a sufficient showing that (a) it can win on the merits 
(significantly better than negligible but not greater than 50%) 
and (b) will suffer irreparable harm absent a stay?  If it has, 
we “balance the relative harms considering all four factors 
using a ‘sliding scale’ approach.  However, if the movant 
does not make the requisite showings on either of these [first] 
two factors, the [] inquiry into the balance of harms [and the 
public interest] is unnecessary, and the stay should be denied 
without further analysis.”  In re Forty-Eight Insulations, 115 
F.3d at 1300–01 (internal citation omitted).  But depending on 
how strong a case the stay movant has on the merits, a stay is 
permissible even if the balance of harms and public interest 
weigh against holding a ruling in abeyance pending appeal.      
B. Application 
Because our assessment of how strong a case IDEA 
has is closely linked to the outcome of the balancing test, we 
begin with the test itself (though we write from the back-end 
first): the stronger the balance of harms and public interest is 
in IDEA’s favor, the less a showing of potential success on 
appeal we demand (keeping in mind that the likelihood of 
success must be at least “a substantial case on the merits,” 
Hilton, 481 U.S. at 778); the lesser the harms, the showing of 
success must be stronger.      
1. Whom does the balance of harms and public 
interest favor?  
To establish irreparable harm, a stay movant “must 
demonstrate an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, 
but actual and imminent.”  Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. 
Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “The possibility that adequate 
compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a 
later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily 
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against a claim of irreparable harm.”  Sampson v. Murray, 
415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Gotanda, supra, at 814 (defining “irreparable injury” 
as “the harm [] the movant will suffer during the pendency of 
the litigation that cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the 
tribunal’s final decision”).   
IDEA asserts that, absent a stay, its appeal will be 
batted out of court by § 363(m), rendering the continued 
operation of its business at the Casino impossible.  As to 
potential money damages, IDEA continues, the most it will 
receive is pennies on the dollar, which grossly undervalues its 
lease (and the millions it invested in reliance of it).  See IDEA 
Br. 41 (arguing that “a money judgment will not compensate 
[it] for [the] loss of its possessory rights under §[]365(h) 
because [Revel] [is] insolvent and, as a result, [has] no ability 
to provide payment on any claim [IDEA] may have”).  For its 
part, Revel responds that IDEA’s argument rests on a flawed 
assumption: that continued possession is substantially more 
valuable than the rejection damages it would receive.  
According to Revel (and the District Court), because Polo 
North would likely walk away from the sale if it were stayed, 
IDEA would be left with nothing but a possessory interest in 
a vacant building.  See In re Revel, 525 B.R. at 32 (“[I]t is 
entirely logical that the absence of any occupant in the [] 
[C]asino would leave [IDEA] with, in essence, a possessory 
right in an empty and commercially-unproductive building.”).      
We do not accept that assertion.  First, there is nothing 
in the record to refute IDEA’s contention that it can operate 
independently of the Casino.  Indeed, a principal purpose of 
its lawsuit against Revel was to confirm IDEA’s right of 
access to a power source so that it can begin running its 
business again.  See Oral Arg. Tr. 85:4–7 (noting that IDEA 
needed a utility easement “to continue to operate and work 
with the utility company”).  We thus deem unsupportable the 
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suggestion of the District Court that, if Polo North walked 
away, IDEA would be left with “a possessory right in an 
empty and commercially-unproductive building.”  In re 
Revel, 525 B.R. at 32.   
That still leaves us with the lingering question of 
whether rejection damages would sufficiently compensate 
IDEA for the loss of possession (and its business).  On that 
question, we have previously observed that, though “a purely 
economic injury, compensable in money, cannot satisfy the 
irreparable injury requirement … an exception exists where 
the potential economic loss is so great as to threaten the 
existence of the movant’s business.”  Minard Run Oil Co. v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 670 F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  That exception applies 
here.  If we deny the stay, IDEA will lose not only its multi-
million dollar investment but also the opportunity to operate 
what was, until the Casino closed, a profitable business.  See 
Oral Arg. Tr. 100:12–18.  In this context, IDEA shows 
sufficient irreparable injury to it absent a stay.  Thus we turn 
to the harm to Revel (the only party who opposed IDEA’s 
request for a stay)10 and the public interest (the latter, in 
essence, balances the benefits and harms to the public if a 
stay is imposed and if it is not).   
In assessing this side of the balance, the District Court 
credited Revel’s “position that the issuance of [a] stay would 
present ‘a real and substantial risk that Polo North would 
elect not to proceed with closing.’”  In re Revel, 525 B.R. at 
                                              
10  Polo North, though obviously having an interest in the 
outcome, took no significant role in advocating for or against 
a stay, and neither the Bankruptcy Court nor the District 
Court suggested that denying a stay would harm it, let alone 
cause irreparable harm.    
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32.  As it does on appeal, Revel’s counsel had argued that 
even a limited stay would trigger bad things: Polo North 
walking away and Revel having to liquidate its assets under 
Chapter 7, which “not only would cause the permanent loss of 
approximately 4,000 jobs the [Casino] once provided, but 
also could cause substantial detriment to the City of Atlantic 
City and the surrounding areas, and possibly further hamper 
reorganization efforts at other casino resorts located in the 
city.”  Revel Br. 50.   
In our view, the adequacy of the proof provided plays 
an important role “[i]n evaluating the harm that will occur 
depending upon whether or not [a] stay is granted.”  Mich. 
Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, 945 F.2d at 154.  
Absent some sort of declaration or other evidence in the 
record that a stay would cause substantial harm, the harm to 
Revel was at best speculative.  Note the context: Revel’s 
counsel told the District Court that granting IDEA a stay only 
to prevent its lease from being extinguished would 
nonetheless spoil the entire sale.11  On the other hand, if 
IDEA lost its lease—a result a stay denial virtually 
guaranteed—its business at Revel’s site would be 
permanently shuttered.  As a result, at the time of our ruling 
in February, the balance-of-harms tilted (at least moderately) 
in favor of IDEA.  
                                              
11  As it turns out, a limited stay didn’t set off the 
consequences Revel and Polo North said it would.  
Notwithstanding the limited stay we put into place on 
February 6, 2015, Revel and Polo North closed two months 
later on April 7.  See Notice of Sale Closing, In re Revel AC, 
Inc., No. 14-22654 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2015), ECF No. 
1553.      
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Does the public interest move the needle?  We have 
doubts that it moves much.  While the public certainly has an 
interest in saving jobs and helping Atlantic City’s often 
sullied reputation, nothing before us indicates how many jobs 
will be brought back of the 4,000 lost, as we were not told 
what use Polo North intended for the sold assets.  On the 
other side, the public has a stake in protecting the rights of 
tenants in commercial properties.  Furthermore, public policy 
strongly favors the correct application of the Bankruptcy 
Code, especially where property rights are at stake.  Overall, 
though the public has an interest in preventing both outcomes, 
we ultimately believe the short-term gain of some jobs in a 
facility that is operational in some way tilts slightly in Revel’s 
favor.   
In any event, our ultimate conclusion need not rest 
primarily on a rough estimation of whom the balance of 
harms and public interest favor.  For, along with IDEA’s 
sufficient showing of irreparable harm to it should a stay not 
be granted, success to it on the merits was assured.  We 
explain why below.  
2. Has IDEA made a strong showing of its 
likelihood of success on the merits? 
IDEA makes three arguments before us on the merits, 
but we need address only one: whether the Bankruptcy and 
District Courts erred in holding that Revel met one of 
§ 363(f)’s statutorily enumerated conditions to sell its assets 
free and clear.  Revel contends they didn’t err because IDEA 
twice sought to establish (via declaratory judgment actions) 
that it held a non-residential lease and Revel denied that 
IDEA had a lease.  In Revel’s view, this proves that a bona 
fide dispute exists under § 363(f)(4), as “a declaratory 
judgment is only proper when an actual ‘case or controversy’ 
exists.”  Revel Br. 34.  We disagree yet again.   
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As an initial matter, the mere filing of a declaratory 
judgment action doesn’t itself create a bona fide dispute under 
§ 363(f)(4), even if Article III’s “case or controversy” 
requirement has been met.  The latter ensures only that the 
declaratory judgment plaintiff has standing and a redressable 
injury.  Further, that IDEA alleged (and Revel denied) the 
former held a non-residential lease doesn’t mean there was a 
bona fide dispute as to the validity of its lease.  “Bona fide 
dispute” in the § 363(f)(4) context means that there is an 
objective basis—either in law or fact—to cast doubt on the 
validity of IDEA’s purported lease.  To satisfy that provision, 
Revel needed to show there was some factual or legal basis to 
deny that IDEA held a “true lease.”  But it did nothing of the 
sort.   
First, a review of IDEA’s complaint makes plain that 
its principal (and only) purpose was to invoke its rights under 
§ 365(h) and “clarify its appurtenant rights for,” among other 
things, “a utility easement,” not to litigate the nature of its 
interest.  Reply Br. 6; see also Oral Arg. Tr. 15:14–15 
(counsel for IDEA noting that its suit was meant only to have 
the Court “declare and enforce [IDEA’s] [] rights” under § 
365(h)).  The relevant paragraphs alleged the following: 
125. [O]n or about May 12, 2012, [Revel] 
and IDEA . . . entered into a lease for 
nonresidential real property concerning certain 
premises at the Casino. 
126. On August 28, 2014, [Revel] filed the 
Rejection Motion. 
127. A hearing on the Rejection Motion is 
currently scheduled for October[]7, 2014. 
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128. If the Rejection Motion is granted, 
IDEA will have an opportunity to make an 
election under Section 365(h) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
129. Section 365(h) . . . provides a lessee of 
real property under a rejected lease with the 
option of either retaining the estate, including, 
among other things, the continued right to 
possession or to treat the lease as terminated. 
130. To the extent that IDEA elects to remain 
in possession, § 365(h) . . . allows it, despite 
rejection, to continue to enjoy its rights under 
such lease that are in or appurtenant to the real 
property, including the right to continued 
possession, utilities and necessary easements. 
Wherefore, [] IDEA seeks an order and judgment as 
follows: 
a. Declaring that, despite rejection of the 
Lease, . . . IDEA may continue to enjoy its 
right under the Lease, including the right 
to continued possession, utility service and 
necessary easements; and 
b. Granting such other relief as is just.     
Reply Br. 5–6 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Am. Compl. ¶¶ 
125–30, IDEA Boardwalk, LLC v. Revel Entm’t Grp., LLC, 
No. 14-01756 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2014), ECF No. 6).   
Moreover, even if IDEA had squarely put the validity 
of its lease at issue, nothing Revel said in response created an 
objective legal dispute.  Revel’s only argument was that its 
agreement with IDEA doesn’t qualify as “a true lease” 
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because it “provides for ‘rent’ payments based entirely on a 
percentage of the revenue derived from [IDEA’s operations]” 
and contains “numerous [] examples of provisions atypical of 
true leases.”  Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 31, IDEA Boardwalk, LLC v. 
Revel Entm’t Grp., LLC, No. 14-01756 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 
13, 2014), ECF No. 8.  Yet Revel failed to cite a single 
authority suggesting that a percentage-lease clause 
disqualifies a purported lease from being one.   
To leave no doubt that a true lease exists, IDEA’s 
agreement with Revel bars any argument to the contrary.  It 
provides that 
[n]othing contained in this Lease shall be 
deemed or construed as creating the relationship 
of . . . partnership or joint venture between the 
parties hereto, it being understood and agreed 
that neither the method of computing rent, 
payment of the Tenant Fees nor any other 
provision contained herein nor any acts of the 
parties hereto shall be deemed to create any 
relationship between the parties other than that 
of Landlord and Tenant.  The provisions of this 
Lease relating to the Percentage Rent payable 
hereunder are included solely for the purpose of 
providing a method whereby adequate rent is to 
be measured and ascertained. 
Mot. to Dismiss Ex. A, at 56, IDEA Boardwalk, LLC v. Revel 
Entm’t Grp., LLC, No. 14-01756 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 13, 
2014) (Section 21.12 of the Lease Agreement), ECF No. 8.  
The only conclusion from this is that any dispute regarding 
the validity of IDEA’s lease was fanciful if not 
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disingenuous.12  As such, we part ways with the District 
Court’s holding that IDEA’s declaratory judgment request 
“provides some objective basis, at a minimum,” of a “bona 
fide issue in dispute.”  In re Revel, 525 B.R. at 29.   
Before we conclude, we would be remiss if we did not 
highlight the troubling consequences of Revel’s argument.  If 
whenever a lessee attempts to invoke its rights under § 365(h) 
by asserting as a predicate that it holds a nonresidential lease, 
                                              
12  Underscoring this is that, on June 24, 2015, the 
Bankruptcy Court, per another Judge, concluded that Revel’s 
agreement with IDEA constitutes a “true lease” under New 
Jersey law and that § 365(h) protects its right “to remain in 
possession for the balance of the terms set forth in the 
Agreement[], and any renewal or extension period.”  In re 
Revel AC, Inc., 532 B.R. 216, 227, 229 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015).  
As to whether the agreement was a true lease, the Court said 
the following: 
 
[Polo North] places before the Court ample case 
law supporting the contention that a court must 
not be swayed by “form over substance” when 
determining the existence of a true lease.  While 
this maxim is accurate, at some point form 
becomes substance.  We have reached that 
point.  The express terms of the Agreement[], 
together with supporting affidavits, make it 
clear that [Revel] and [IDEA] had the 
unequivocal intention of entering into true lease 
agreements.  
 




every debtor would be well advised to file an answer denying 
that the lease exists.  Revel’s only response is that, by filing a 
declaratory judgment action, IDEA is “affirmatively alleging, 
subject to Rule 11, that there is a dispute as to that issue,” as 
there needs to be “an actual case or controversy” in order to 
have a declaratory judgment action.  Oral Arg. Tr. 70:10–17.  
That argument makes no sense.  A declaratory judgment 
plaintiff does not fall afoul of Rule 11 by making an 
allegation in its complaint that it knows to be true.  That rule 
comes into play only where a plaintiff files a complaint 
without basis in law or fact.  Quite the opposite is what we 
have here.             
V. Conclusion 
The factors favoring a stay weigh solidly with IDEA.  
First, that it would prevail on the merits was all but assured 
because nothing in the record casts doubt on the validity of its 
lease with Revel, thus prohibiting the latter from invoking 
§ 363(f) and selling its assets free of IDEA’s lease.  Second, 
IDEA demonstrated that, absent a stay, it would lose its club 
business at the Casino, and this was sufficient to show 
irreparable harm.  On the balancing of harms, perhaps Revel 
could have tilted the balance in its favor with its own showing 
of irreparable harm, but it didn’t come close, as it relied only 
on its counsel’s hollow representations of harm rather than 
record evidence.  Thus, while the public interest appears to 
favor a stay denial, that alone doesn’t tip the four-factor 
balance in Revel’s favor.  We thus reverse and stay only the 
part of the Sale Order that allows Revel to sell the Casino free 
and clear of IDEA’s lease. 
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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 Mindful of the deference we owe to the District Court 
under the applicable standard of review and the test for 
obtaining a stay, I part company with the Majority and would 
affirm the District Court’s order denying IDEA’s motion for a 
stay of the sale order pending appeal.1  First, I disagree with 
the Majority’s new interpretation of the requirements for 
obtaining a stay.  Second, I conclude that the District Court 
thoroughly considered the entire record and all of the relevant 
factors and acted within its discretion when it held that the 
requirements to obtain a stay had not been satisfied.2    
 
 The Majority’s “sliding scale” approach for obtaining 
such equitable relief fails to honor our precedent’s 
conjunctive four-part test to obtain a stay and it would permit 
relief to be granted upon a particularly strong showing on just 
a single factor, apparently even if at least one factor weighs 
against the movant.  To obtain a stay pending appeal, a 
movant must demonstrate all four of the following elements: 
(1) that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that 
irreparable harm will occur in the absence of a stay; (3) that 
granting the stay will not result in greater harm to other 
parties; and (4) that the public interest favors a stay.  Hilton v. 
                                              
 1 As we must limit our review to the District Court’s 
decision based on the facts it had before it at the time, I do 
not—and cannot—consider events that arose thereafter.   
 2 Additionally, I would reach the issue of our 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and conclude that 
we do have jurisdiction under that statute.  See Jackson v. 
Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2011) (asserting 
appellate jurisdiction over the denial of a stay or injunction). 
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Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Jackson v. Danberg, 
656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011); Republic of Phil. v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 1991).  
Notwithstanding whatever extent to which these factors may 
be “balanced” against one another such that a relatively 
stronger showing on one may excuse a relatively weaker, but 
still extant, showing on another, a complete failure to satisfy 
any one of these factors precludes a stay.3  See, e.g., 
NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters. Inc., 176 F.3d 151, 153 
                                              
 3 The Majority suggests that this Court has endorsed a 
sliding scale approach in Constructors Association of Western 
Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978) and 
Delaware River Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer 
Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1974).  As noted in the 
text, however, this Court has repeatedly emphasized that all 
four factors must be independently satisfied to justify the 
grant of preliminary equitable relief, and the Supreme Court 
has presented the four-factor test as conjunctive, meaning that 
all four factors must be satisfied to obtain a stay.  See, e.g., 
Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776.  Further, even to the extent that these 
cases can be read to embrace a “sliding scale” or “balancing” 
approach (which I do not necessarily view as equivalent), 
neither states or implies that a movant’s complete failure to 
satisfy any of the four factors can be excused.  See Kreps, 573 
F.2d at 815 (suggesting an injunction might be appropriate 
even where the movant “did not demonstrate as strong a 
likelihood of ultimate success as would generally be 
required” if each of the other factors “strongly favor[s] the 
moving party” (emphasis added)).  In my view, an essential 
prerequisite to “balancing” the factors is the requirement that 




(3d Cir. 1999) (“A plaintiff’s failure to establish any element 
in its favor renders a preliminary injunction inappropriate.”); 
Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 
187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Only if the movant produces 
evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four 
factors favor preliminary relief should the injunction issue.”); 
ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(vacating preliminary injunction based on “dispositive” 
failure to satisfy one of the four factors). 
 
 Contrary to the Majority’s assertion, requiring a 
movant to satisfy each factor is not unfair.  Indeed, it is 
warranted.  Equitable relief, including injunctions and stays, 
is an extraordinary remedy, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008), and movants must 
accordingly meet a high bar to obtain it.  Here, that means the 
movant must satisfy all four requirements to obtain a stay.  
See N.J. Hosp. Ass’n v. Waldman, 73 F.3d 509, 512-13 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (stating that an “injunction shall issue only if the 
plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to convince the district 
court that all four factors favor preliminary relief” (quoting 
Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 
628, 632-33 (3d Cir. 1992)).  The Majority’s test weakens this 
conjunctive test and makes it possible to, for example, obtain 
a stay or injunction simply because a party has made a strong 
showing on the merits, even though the harm that may befall 
it is compensable with money.  This possibility is contrary to 
our precedent, which also requires an applicant seeking 
injunctive relief to show irreparable harm.  Frank’s GMC 
Truck Center, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 
& n.3 (3d Cir. 1987).  Thus, the Majority’s approach makes it 
more likely that what should be an extraordinary remedy will 
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be afforded on a more ordinary basis.4  For these reasons, we 
should not adopt the Majority’s version of the sliding scale 
approach insofar as it excuses total failure to satisfy any one 
of the four factors, and we should continue to apply the four-
factor test entrenched in binding precedent.  If proof of each 
factor is adduced, then a district court can and should 
carefully consider each factor, accord each the weight it 
believes appropriate in the particular case, and determine 
whether, on balance, the extraordinary relief sought should be 
granted. 
 
 That is exactly what the District Court did here.  The 
District Court carefully considered each of the factors and did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that none were 
satisfied.  First, the District Court astutely acknowledged that 
if the sale proceeded, IDEA would be no worse off than it 
was at the time it made its request for relief.  It was not 
clearly erroneous for the District Court to find, based on the 
facts before it, that IDEA was not conducting any business 
because Revel was closed, and that IDEA would be unable to 
conduct business if the sale fell through and Revel remained 
closed.5  It also was not clearly erroneous for the District 
Court to surmise that IDEA would likely not reopen its 
business if the sale proceeded, and thus that allowing the sale 
to proceed would cause it no additional harm.  Moreover, any 
                                              
 4 In fact, in this case, the Majority granted a stay even 
though it concluded that the public interest factor favored the 
non-movant, and thus the four-factor test was not met. 
 5 The analysis might be different if the facility was 
accessible and the lessee was operating, in which case a sale 
free and clear of its interest could disrupt its business.  This, 
however, is not the case here. 
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injury to IDEA would be compensable with money.6  While 
collection may prove challenging, this hurdle is no different 
from that facing any other unsecured creditor. 
 
 Second, it was not clearly erroneous for the District 
Court to conclude that staying the sale would likely cause 
greater harm to others, including the estate and other 
creditors.  Each month without a sale generated millions of 
dollars in carrying costs to maintain the closed facility.  These 
expenditures depleted Revel’s assets and the District Court 
correctly observed that a prompt sale would end these 
expenditures.  Moreover, the sale would provide an 
immediate opportunity to obtain assets for the estate, which it 
could then use to begin to repay its creditors.  Thus, it was 
reasonable for the District Court to conclude that a prompt 
sale would both preserve existing and generate additional 
estate assets, whereas staying the sale would continue to 
dissipate estate funds and, at a minimum, delay the collection 
of additional assets.  Given Revel’s substantial challenges in 
finding a prospective buyer, it was far from idle speculation 
for Revel to fear that the loss of this buyer would significantly 
delay its ability to satisfy its creditors.  For these reasons, the 
District Court acted within its discretion in denying the stay, 
                                              
 6 I recognize that, in exceptional circumstances, 
economic loss that threatens a movant’s business can 
constitute irreparable harm sufficient to enjoin an action that 
poses such a threat, Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
670 F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 2012), but no evidence was 
presented to show that the sale will cause such a loss.  This is 
not surprising because it was Revel’s closing, and not its sale, 
that caused IDEA’s inability to operate.   
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as a stay would likely cause greater harm to others than the 
absence of a stay would cause IDEA.7 
 
 Third, the District Court had a sound basis to conclude 
that granting the stay would not be in the public interest.  As 
stated above, Revel faced difficulties securing a buyer, and 
having one in hand would certainly serve the public interest.  
At the time, it appeared that allowing the sale to proceed 
quickly would lead to the reopening of a large facility, which 
had employed (and would likely again employ) thousands of 
people.  Thus, as even the Majority concedes, the sale 
presented the opportunity for numerous jobs in an 
economically depressed community.  The District Court thus 
did not err in finding that denying the stay is in the public 
interest.    
 
 Finally, although the preceding analysis makes it 
unnecessary to reach this factor, I would hold that the District 
Court also appropriately concluded that IDEA did not 
demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits, 
notwithstanding the Majority’s assertion that success on the 
merits was “all but assured.”  Since the Majority has focused 
only on IDEA’s argument that the Bankruptcy Court erred in 
                                              
 7 Moreover, granting IDEA a stay would allow it to 
interfere with the orderly collection and distribution of assets 
and impact other creditors.  IDEA is an unsecured creditor 
and, in the normal course, would have to await satisfaction of 
obligations to the secured creditors before it could be 
compensated.  The stay would enable IDEA to catapult ahead 
of all other creditors, and place itself in a position to demand 




holding that Revel met one of 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)’s conditions 
to sell its assets free and clear of IDEA’s lease, I will likewise 
focus on this issue.   
 
 Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(e), an entity with “an interest 
in property” that is proposed to be sold can request the 
bankruptcy court to “prohibit or condition such . . . sale . . . as 
is necessary to provide adequate protection of such interest.”  
11 U.S.C. § 363(e).  The trustee, however, may sell the 
property “free and clear” if, among other things, “such 
interest is in bona fide dispute.”  11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(4).  The 
issue before the District Court was whether the record before 
it supported a finding that there was a bona fide dispute about 
whether IDEA had a leasehold interest in the space it 
occupied at Revel. 
 
 The Majority discounts the propriety of relying on 
IDEA’s request for a declaratory judgment that it had a 
nonresidential lease as reflecting a bona fide dispute.  While 
requesting a declaratory judgment alone does not 
automatically mean a bona fide dispute exists, the District 
Court here acted within its discretion to find a bona fide 
dispute existed based on the pleadings and the declaratory 
judgment IDEA sought.  A declaratory judgment action asks 
a court to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any 
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not 
further relief is or could be sought.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).  
When determining whether to exercise jurisdiction under § 
2201, a district court is to consider, among other things, “the 
likelihood that a federal court declaration will resolve the 
uncertainty of obligation which gave rise to the controversy.”  
Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 129, 140 (3d Cir. 
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, it is fair to 
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infer that, if a party seeks a declaratory judgment, it believes 
there is a dispute about a matter regarding which it seeks 
certainty.  Here, IDEA wanted to secure relief under § 363(e).  
To do so, it needed a property interest.  Aware that Revel may 
attempt to characterize IDEA’s interest as a management 
agreement or partnership rather than a leasehold interest, it 
sought court intervention.  These events provided the District 
Court with sufficient grounds to find that there was a strong 
likelihood that Revel would establish that there was a bona 
fide dispute about IDEA’s interest in the property.  While the 
Majority questions whether the dispute was indeed bona fide 
based upon the language of the lease agreement (and the 
Bankruptcy Court’s finding months later concerning the 
lease), I cannot say that the District Court abused its 
discretion in relying on IDEA’s own pleadings, which 
arguably conveyed its concern that Revel may dispute its 
interest.8 
 
     For these reasons, the District Court appropriately 
found that IDEA failed to satisfy any of the requirements 
needed to obtain a stay, and I would affirm the District 
Court’s order denying the motion to stay the sale pending 
appeal. 
                                              
 8 The Majority also notes that the Bankruptcy Court 
did not make explicit findings concerning the conditions 
needed to adequately protect IDEA’s possessory interest.  
Even assuming that its analysis lacked precision, this alone 
does not mean that the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying the stay. 
